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A B S T R A C T
This paper documents the Intuitive Logics scenario planning process and its relationship with horizon scanning
activity in order to evaluate the separate and joint usefulness of these methods for anticipating the future. The
speciﬁc objectives of this paper are to: (i) identify and diﬀerentiate scenario planning and horizon scanning
methodologies (ii) discuss & evaluate their analytic underpinnings, and (iii) critically appraise their separate and
combined value and eﬀectiveness in relation to enhancing organizational preparedness for the future. Our
analysis culminates with speciﬁcations to (iv) enhance the identiﬁcation of ‘weak signals' in Horizon Scanning by
utilizing a systematically broadened range of both negatively-valenced and positively-valenced scenario story-
lines.
1. Introduction
Foresight activities are designed to push the boundaries of human
perception and engender long-term critical thinking as individuals en-
vision desired states, formulate strategies to address the consequences
of current actions, and identify and avoid negative futures (Slaughter,
1995). In order to anticipate important shifts and events, organizations
must continuously scrutinize and have deep knowledge of the driving
forces that inﬂuence environmental changes, and better understand the
associations, dynamics and interactions between these (Martelli, 2014).
Similarly, they must be able to identify emergent patterns still in the
infancy of their emergence, separating out those considered to signal
important future changes from those merely representative of ran-
domness or ‘noise’. However, while it is therefore essential to consider
and prepare for futures for which there is some present evidence, and
for which presently-existing driving forces might therefore be identi-
ﬁed, it is also important to consider potential futures which are not
leaving any evidential trace in the present – the latter being the most
profound source of uncertainty, representing so-called ‘unknown un-
knowns’.
Scenario Planning (SP) is a strategic foresight tool that is designed
to explore and anticipate change, by challenging planners' beliefs and
perceptions (Ringland, 2006; Schwartz, 1996; Van Der Heijden et al.,
2002). It is claimed that the approach has many cognitive, strategic and
competitive advantages (Meissner and Wulf, 2013; Postma and Liebl,
2005; Ramirez et al., 2013). SP facilitates a consideration of the future
that is embedded in present evidential circumstances, but does not
conﬁne consideration of the future to a straightforward projection of
these present developments as, for example, forecasting might. Instead,
it facilitates consideration of how developments that begin in present
evidential circumstances might play out in diﬀerent ways such that
present circumstances are transformed in some way, leading to a future
that is very diﬀerent from the present (Derbyshire and Wright, 2017).
Horizon Scanning (HS) also eschews the attempt to create projections
of the future; it instead aims to continuously and objectively explore,
monitor and assess current developments and their potential implica-
tions for the future (Miles and Saritas, 2012). The HS approach has been
integrated with the scenario planning approach to engender continuity
and give on-going purpose to scenario narratives (Ramirez et al., 2013;
Schoemaker et al., 2013). Practitioners argue that their integration
provides greater beneﬁts, enhances preparedness and increases value
for organizations, than does either in isolation. The present paper seeks
to evaluate these claims by providing a review of scenario planning and
horizon-scanning processes in order to determine their individual and
combined success and value in practice.
The paper concludes by setting out an approach to enhance the
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identiﬁcation of ‘weak signals' in Horizon Scanning by utilizing a sys-
tematically broadened range of both negatively-valenced and posi-
tively-valenced scenario storylines, leading to a fully combined and
integrated scenario planning and horizon scanning approach to con-
sideration of the future. Essentially, the scenario process is used to
identify potential weak signals that might be presently evidenced
through horizon scanning if the scenario were indeed representative of
an emergent, potential future.
2. Scenario planning
2.1. Intuitive Logics
Scenario planning (SP) is a collaborative process to envision alter-
native future environments, articulate their implications, test the logic
of long term plans, strategies and policies (O'Brien et al., 2007;
Ringland, 2002; Schwartz, 1996) and, ultimately, prepare for im-
pending change, using plausible and consistent narratives about the
future (Porter, 1998). In this view, a single scenario gives one view of
the future - whereas multiple scenarios depict a number of prospects
and deepen the focus, expression and understanding of possible changes
and developments (Fotr et al., 2015; O'Brien et al., 2007; Schwartz,
1996). By considering multiple possible scenarios, recognition is given
to the indeterminate and emergent nature of the future, in contrast to
forecasting-based approaches to consideration of the future, which
often simply extrapolate on the basis of present and past trends.
The Intuitive Logics (IL) approach to SP is without dispute the most
used and documented scenario approach. According to Martelli (2001),
the majority of practitioners favour this approach as it is ﬂexible,
capable of identifying emergent patterns, generates new ideas, makes
use of any available information about the future, and can be used in
any organization, context or setting. In its many methodological var-
iations, the approach can be conducted in as few as six steps (Ringland,
1998; Ringland, 2002; Ringland, 2006; Schwartz, 1996), or as many as
fourteen (Godet, 2000; O'Brien et al., 2007), with some activities fo-
cusing purely on scenario development and others emphasizing the
additional development of strategies that are robust against the range of
constructed scenarios.
The IL approach is usually conducted in a workshop setting and,
according to Martelli (2014), there are as many ways to conduct the IL
approach as there are practitioners. Despite this, there are some
common activities that are performed in the process (O'Brien et al.,
2007; Ringland, 2002; Schwartz, 1996). These are graphically depicted
in Fig. 1:
Problem deﬁnition: In this stage, the purpose of the SP exercise is
deﬁned and participants brain-storm to identify key uncertainties and
pre-determined elements of the future.
Scenario development: In this stage, planners derive themes to outline
scenario logics and develop reliable and credible descriptions of events
by causally linking the driving forces in a plausible and consistent
manner. This is seen as the heart of the scenario process, since strategy
development and future plans hinge on the credibility of scenario
narratives.
Strategy development: After scenario development, planners evaluate
current and in-development strategy against the developed scenarios.
The entire process is designed so that, at every stage, participants'
perceptions are challenged.
2.2. Perspective-broadening eﬀects from scenario planning
Practitioners and academics imply a host of cognitive, commu-
nicative and cultural beneﬁts that result from the use of scenarios, ar-
guing that it encourages organizational change by leveraging diﬀerent
opinions to create a shared view of the present and future (Mason and
Herman, 2014; Schoemaker, 1995; Van Der Heijden, 2005). SP is pro-
fessed to improve awareness as it promotes strategic thinking in terms
of systems and interactions (Martelli, 2001), raises complex questions
and discussions (Fink et al., 2004; Van Der Heijden, 2005), fosters
creative foresight to rethink strategies and plans; especially in times of
accelerated or anticipated changes (O'Brien et al., 2007), helps orga-
nizations cope with sudden shifts by accumulating knowledge and in-
tegrating it into the future actions (Peterson et al., 2003; Vacík et al.,
2014); by allowing them to leverage internal resources, competencies
and capabilities, especially if an unfavorable future were to materialize,
reduce cognitive biases, enhance organizational learning, and improve
the quality of decision making (Bradﬁeld, 2008; Haeﬀner et al., 2012;
Meissner and Wulf, 2013; Schoemaker, 1993) by emphasizing the need
for ﬂexibility in uncertain environments.
2.3. Potential perspective-narrowing eﬀects from scenario planning
According to Mintzberg (2003), and in contrast to the implied po-
sitive eﬀects discussed above, SP can limit an organization's ability to
be responsive as it encourages managers to observe and wait for pre-
conceived events to unfold; thus an organization and its managers may
be unable to recognize and act on unexpected changes that have not
been considered, limiting ability to prepare for the future. If the orga-
nization perceives that the future will only unfold according to their
derived scenarios, then there may be increased vulnerability to surprise
events (Mason and Herman, 2014; Ringland, 2002), which is the op-
posite of SP's intended purpose. Here, the organizational focus may be
on the most likely or favored scenario. So, instead of opening minds and
perceptions, SP interventions can act to narrow views of the future
(Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Neugarten, 2006). Further, the identi-
ﬁcation of essential components of the scenarios (driving forces, un-
certainties and trends) can be inﬂuenced by the scenario developers'
most recent experiences (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; O'Brien et al.,
2007; Ringland, 2002; Schoemaker, 1995; Wright and Cairns, 2011;
Wright et al., 2013), leading to so-called ‘recency bias’. The result may
be easily-conceived but unsurprising scenarios that do not consider a
broad range of futures. Indeed, most writers agree that a quality SP
process is dependent on the facilitator's skills (Giaoutzi and Sapoio,
2013; Martelli, 2001) and the ability to recognize when bias from re-
cent experiences will inﬂuence SP activities.
Fig. 1. Intuitive Logics process (Adapted
from O'Brien et al., 2007; Ringland, 2006;
Schwartz, 1996).
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In an eﬀort to address some of the aforementioned issues, practi-
tioners have sought to combine the SP method with other techniques.
The focus in recent times has been on those techniques that can en-
hance the purpose and continuity of SP initiatives. One such technique
is horizon scanning, to which we now turn.
3. Horizon scanning
3.1. The strategic early warning system and weak signals
The use of Horizon Scanning (HS) is intended to develop an orga-
nization's capability for identifying subtle environmental changes, al-
lowing organizations to cultivate a high awareness and understanding
of their environment, leading to a quick and eﬀective response to
changes and events (Miles and Saritas, 2012). While there is no current
consensus on the exact meaning of the term ‘horizon scanning’, Garnett
et al. (2016) describe HS as the comprehensive and systematic ex-
amination of risk, uncertainty and emerging trends, in order to reframe
perceptions and identify implicit and explicit assumptions about the
future.
The origins of HS lie in environmental scanning, strategic foresight
and Ansoﬀ's (1975) Strategic Early Warning System (SEW). Strategic
foresight activities aim to envision future states, and identify emergent
trends at an early stage of their emergence, as-well-as giving con-
sideration to the implications of present actions and decisions on future
events (Slaughter, 1995). In particular, the SEW system is intended to
aid strategic foresight activities by identifying ‘weak signals’. A ‘weak
signal’ is an ambiguous, seemingly unimportant or unexceptional trend
that can considerably impact an organization's aims and objectives, but
requires correct interpretation (Godet, 1994); after interpretation it
then becomes an early warning signal (Lesca and Lesca, 2011). Weak
signals are not easily identiﬁed or appropriately interpreted
(Derbyshire, 2016; Fink et al., 2004; Tessun, 1997). It follows, then,
that the ability to identify and correctly interpret the implications of
weak signals is crucial to horizon scanning, its eﬃcacy as a tool to aid
consideration of the future being dependent on this ability.
Authors sometimes use the terms ‘environmental scanning’ (ES) and
‘horizon scanning’ synonymously, or view the latter as a subset of the
former (Miles and Saritas, 2012); however, there are some key diﬀer-
ences between the two. ES is concerned with monitoring and perusing
an institution's current macro-level environment - i.e., the political,
economic, social, technological, natural and legal, and competitive
landscape - for changes, trends, opportunities and threats (Choo, 2002).
ES is an ongoing process, where departments uncover and share recent
or upcoming developments with the wider group. ES usually supports
short-term decision making as its primary objective is usually to acquire
industry speciﬁc and competitive information (Choo, 2002; Miles and
Saritas, 2012; Ramírez and Selsky, 2014).
By contrast, HS adopts a long-term orientation to probe novel con-
cerns and emerging driving forces within a future context (Miles and
Saritas, 2012); for this reason it is considered a foresight activity
(Schoemaker et al., 2013). Like SP, practitioners claim its true value lies
in enhancing the ‘cognitive agility’ of planners by extending long-term
thinking and exploring future developments (Marsh et al., 2014).
3.2. The horizon scanning process
The HS process is mostly data driven and entails noticing changes
(Neugarten, 2006), gathering information and evidence on these de-
velopments, interpreting and validating the ﬁndings and using them to
make informed decisions and policies (Marsh et al., 2014). HS practi-
tioners employ bespoke means of organizing and interpreting the in-
formation they gather to enhance organizational knowledge. As with
SP, there is no agreed-upon standard methodology. However, even with
the diﬀering approaches, there are common activities that are per-
formed within the process and these activities are depicted in Fig. 2:
Exploration: The ﬁrst phase and entire process involves exploration
via continuous information gathering, monitoring and scanning of the
external environment. This activity can be automated, web-based or
manually conducted in workshops or brainstorming sessions. Upon
noticing changes, developments or perceived weak signals, managers
will focus their attention on the organization's concerns associated with
these changes, organizing, prioritizing and managing information to
determine what is pertinent to the perceived issues. During this process,
relevant information is transformed into evidence that is used to assess
the key issues and concerns.
Assessment: In this second phase, planners must go beyond what is
known or assumed about the issue to clearly assess the value of the
evidence and its implications for the future.
Application: This phase involves disseminating the outcome of the
assessment phase to aid in foresight activities, strategy and policy
creation or revision, risk analysis and decision making. The results of
HS are often used in periodic updates or annual reports to inform the
organization of drivers of change, inhibitors and enablers of future
objectives, emerging research themes and research topics that lead to
new areas of enquiry (Garnett et al., 2016).
The ﬁnal stage requires the organization to continue the HS activ-
ities to continually enhance organizational knowledge and the decision-
making process. But, as Cunha et al. (2006) explain, as time passes,
organizational knowledge has temporary validity and so contemporary
strategic plans and understandings of the environment can become
unrelated. As such, all planning and monitoring needs to be a con-
tinuous, integrated process so that current strategies and decisions re-
ﬂect current and probable developments.
3.3. Criticisms of the horizon scanning approach
A criticism that has been levelled at HS is that it is an unsystematic
process that eventually leads to information overload and so, in actu-
ality, adds little in value to organizational knowledge (Schoemaker
et al., 2013). Herbert Simon noted that a wealth of information in-
evitably means a dearth of something else - a scarcity of whatever in-
formation consumes; and what information consumes is attention
(Simon, 1971). Large amounts of information do not necessarily
translate into a higher-level of knowledge for this reason; the produc-
tion of knowledge from information requires that a signal is sifted out
from meaningless ‘noise’ (Silver, 2012). The more information avail-
able, the more diﬃcult this becomes. Kahneman (2011, p.241) has
shown how humans are not very good at this sifting task, and that
statistical algorithms ‘greatly outdo’ humans at it, especially in in-
formation-rich environments. Statistical algorithms are more likely
than humans to identify ‘weakly valid clues’ (Kahneman, 2011, p.241;
Makridakis and Bakas, 2016). Taleb (2001) similarly noted the human
tendency to identify patterns in data, even where none exist.
How, then, can important but, at present, weakly-indicated signals
be recognised? And how can the human tendency to see spurious pat-
terns in information be avoided? Postma and Liebl (2005) suggest
searching for something without knowing what it is and where to ﬁnd
it. Based on Postma and Liebl's (2005) view, this is like ﬁnding a le-
gendary artefact; it may be valuable, but that value can only be ap-
praised by those with the skill, knowledge and expertise to do so. Yet,
such an approach is likely to exacerbate the tendency to identify
spurious and meaningless patterns. Schultz (2006) contends that the
identiﬁcation of a weak signal is an ‘entirely judgemental pursuit’ with
little or no guidance to justify identiﬁcation, yet this too is likely to
leave us susceptible to the same danger of misidentiﬁcation. Further-
more, even if correctly identiﬁed, the importance of, and actions to-
wards the signal need to be understood and initiated within an orga-
nizational context that is, in any event, likely to be concerned with
current day-to-day problems and issues (Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002;
Wright and Cairns, 2011).
Indeed, what may be referred to as ‘organizational receptiveness’ is
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a fundamental problem, and one that renders the correct identiﬁcation
of weak signals highly problematic. The information gathering compo-
nent of the HS process is quite straightforward; but organizations must
develop capabilities to sort through the noise surrounding the key in-
formation that is generated. Ramirez et al. (2013) explain that as in-
formational sources increase, so do the number of ‘potentially relevant’
issues and concerns identiﬁed within it. Moreover, conﬂicting in-
formation renders it challenging to justify strategic and operational
adjustments (Ilmola and Kuusi, 2006). The result can be ‘information
paralysis’ – either over-analysis of trivial ﬁndings or under-analysis of
important ﬁndings (Schoemaker et al., 2013).
The exploration and assessment phases in HS are also highly sub-
jective, and are prone to the cognitive bias of selectively discarding or
retaining information that either support current beliefs or disconﬁrm
other's beliefs about future developments (Cunha et al., 2006; Meissner
and Wulf, 2013; Wright and Cairns, 2011). HS operatives tend to be low
in the organizational hierarchy and may face issues of lack of insight
into, and awareness of, senior managers' concerns.
What these many diﬃculties bring into question is the ease with
which the signal and the noise can be separated in HS, so as to identify
important weak signals. Day and Schoemaker (2004) suggest the so-
lution to this problem to be strong ‘peripheral vision’. The notion was
introduced to management theory in 2003 and has since amassed a
great deal of attention in strategic planning and foresight.
Conceptually, these authors argue that in order to understand re-
levant developments and become more responsive to the ever-changing
business environment, organizations need to ‘immerse themselves in
the periphery’, since events that are outside of an organization's focal
interests may have the greatest impact on its survival (Haeckel, 2004;
Neugarten, 2006). Authors emphasize parallels between human visual
capabilities and those of an organization, referring to blind-spots, 20/
20 vision, active and passive vision and attentional blindness
(Neugarten, 2006). It is important to recognize that objects in the visual
periphery are ambiguous, blurred and distorted; however, when at-
tention is directed towards the object, it becomes clear and more easily
interpreted. The theory espouses that this is also applicable to organi-
zations, since shifting their focus towards events on the periphery
brings them into focus, but creates blind spots and obscurities in other
directions (Day and Schoemaker, 2004). However, this viewpoint,
especially with respect to ‘blind-spots’ which are a key theme in per-
ipheral theory, assumes that an organization is like an individual with
limited attentional capabilities. Attentional resources are always
bounded and never inﬁnite (Simon, 1971), meaning that focus applied
in one direction inevitably reduces focus applied in another. Indeed,
Herbert Simon's concept of ‘bounded rationality’ is a key one in this
regard.
Practically, the organization must scan and evaluate distant or
seemingly unrelated external events, that are beyond their traditional
environment – events that may lead to potentially advantageous or
problematic situations (Neugarten, 2006; Sarpong and Amankwah-
Amoah, 2015). The objective is to broaden an organization's awareness,
an activity that requires practise and relies on judgement (Day and
Schoemaker, 2004; Day and Schoemaker, 2005). In organizations,
peripheral visioning can entail engaging in seemingly unrelated, non-
standard activities. For example, the US Army developed a free online
computer game to gain insight into identifying, screening and training
potential candidates. At the time, the method was questioned as it was,
at ﬁrst, seen to be a trivial and unrealistic means of adding knowledge
to the army; but the programme had several unforeseen beneﬁts. Tens
of thousands of players passed the virtual bootcamp and completed
more than one hundred million tactical missions that allowed strate-
gists to observe the tactics of the best players and use them to develop
new strategies for street warfare or close combat situations (Brown,
2004). Thus, this peripheral activity and its resultant beneﬁts became
salient to the US Army. It is, though, unknown whether such periph-
erally-focused concern and activity is a standard procedure within the
US Army. In our view, identiﬁcation of such peripheral signals – even
when observers are sensitized to the importance of the underlying issue
- requires creativity and often, perhaps, luck. We will return to this
issue in the Section 6.1 of this paper.
4. Comparative analysis of scenario planning and horizon
scanning processes
When the SP &HS processes are juxtaposed similarities become
apparent (see Fig. 3). Both the IL approach to SP and the HS activity
typically commence with a brainstorming session in which stakeholders
share ideas and views to deﬁne the focal issue. This is often the viability
of the focal organization over a pre-deﬁned time-period in the case of
the IL approach to SP or, for HS, is often a key revenue-generating
activity of the focal organization. Both SP and HS approaches identify/
consider the drivers (i.e., trends or critical uncertainties) in the external
Fig. 2. Horizon scanning process.
Adapted from Miles and Saritas (2012), Neugarten (2006) and
Marsh et al. (2014).
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environment that can impact the focal issue, and then use these drivers
as the basis for identifying particular signals of change (Garnett et al.,
2016). Within the IL SP process, the identiﬁed uncertainties are orga-
nized according to both degree of importance and degree of predict-
ability and then used as the framework for scenario development. In the
HS process, a stage occurs in which particular change-related in-
formation is gathered, over time, on particular set of driving forces.
The second phase of both activities involves using perceptions and
judgement to consider the impact of possible future events on the focal
issue of concern. HS uses perceptions as a means of interpreting current
developments and their implications for the future, whereas the IL SP
approach can be characterized by thinking-through the relationships
between driving forces in order to develop relatively independent
clusters that preserve both time precedence and causal inﬂuence/im-
pact. An important diﬀerence here might therefore be that the basis for
thinking about the future in HS is current developments in terms of how
identiﬁed driving forces are presently playing out and bringing change,
albeit they are still at an early stage of their unfolding. In SP, by con-
trast, the uncertain way in which driving forces are assumed to interact
and play out is not necessarily based on current developments, and how
the identiﬁed driving forces are playing presently, thereby giving freer
range to consider future possibilities not currently manifest in present
empirical trends or causal patterns. The implication is that HS used in
isolation only allows for consideration of those parts of the state space
of all possible futures currently leaving an empirical trail in the forms of
weak signals and emergent combinations of causes. SP, by contrast,
allows for a broader consideration of this state space, giving free range
to imagine causes that are not manifesting themselves empirically in
the present.
In the third phase, those facilitating scenario interventions in or-
ganizations often turn to aid the development of robust strategies -
strategies that perform well across the range of constructed scenarios.
By contrast, in this phase, horizon scanners disseminate what they
deem as relevant ﬁndings to others (often more senior) in the organi-
zation - perhaps to be utilized in other foresight activities, which could,
in fact, include a scenario planning exercise or could simply be giving
consideration to policy/strategy in a less-structured way. Thus, HS is
explicitly expected to be an on-going process; whereas SP activities can
have varying agendas and may be a one-oﬀ rather than continuous
process.
We turn now to a consideration of how SP and HS can be better
integrated so as to provide a holistic consideration of the future that
allows room for both consideration of possibilities not presently based
on empirically-observable trends or causes, leading to a more global
robustness, and consideration of potential futures that are leaving a
present empirical trace in the form of weak signals and sets of ob-
servable causes. By combining SP and HS, a combined local and more
global robustness can be better achieved than is achievable through the
use of either one in isolation (Fig. 4).
5. Integration of scenario planning and horizon scanning
Fink et al. (2004) claim that SP can play a signiﬁcant role in orga-
nizing and prioritizing HS processes, since SP can (i) set the context for
subsequent HS, and (ii) deﬁne the scope and extent of the environ-
mental monitoring system. Conversely, HS activities provide scenario
interventions with a continuing organizational purpose – allowing SP to
become an organizational activity that is used to integrate HS activity
outputs (Schoemaker et al., 2013). Furthermore, HS can act as a means
to evidence created scenarios, ensuring they have relevance to current
circumstances and strategy, rather than simply providing an opportu-
nity for blue-sky thinking about a distant future devoid of any present
applicability.
HS is, after the stage of selecting particular weak signals to be
monitored, often focused on the collection of objective data that is
linked to these signals, in comparison to the largely judgmental ap-
proach of IL SP. HS therefore allows for the empirical evidencing of the
possibility for created scenarios to transpire, based on changes already
underway, which can be useful for galvanising the attention and re-
source needed to action any important insights that may have emerged.
Fig. 3. Comparison of methodologies.
Fig. 4. Integration of approaches.
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Often, HS web-based systems allow continuous data and information
retrieval so organizations can capture and monitor developments in
real-time, and adjust policies and strategies in light of those changes
(Garnett et al., 2016; Miles and Saritas, 2012). Such web-based systems
can assist in dealing with the problem, highlighted earlier by reference
to Kahneman (2011), in which there is clear superiority for statistical
algorithms in terms of identifying still weakly-emergent patterns in
comparison to human judgement. Where human judgement still pre-
vails over machine-learning, however, is in the ability to conceive of
futures which are completely diﬀerent to that which presently exists,
and which may not, therefore, have any evidential basis in the present.
The SP approach is more organic and subjective and provides a context
for discussion and interpretation of perceived changes and develop-
ments, allowing for consideration of just such futures, but the SP pro-
cess does not, by itself, establish a system to monitor current or likely
developments in relation to these imagined futures, in order to monitor
if they represent genuine future possibilities. This can be a factor that
hinders SP, as an isolated intervention, from being an on-going process.
Indeed, SP's judgement and subjective approach and its limited
empirical basis - albeit incorporating identiﬁcation of plausible causal
chains - represents an important advantage over HS. As noted earlier,
Mintzberg (2003) suggests that SP encourages managers to observe and
wait for identiﬁed, pre-conceived events to unfold, meaning they may
be unable to recognize and act on unexpected changes, limiting their
ability to prepare for the future. The implication is that SP can have a
perspective-narrowing eﬀect that is the opposite of that intended.
However, based on the above discussion, it is clear that this tendency is
perhaps even more likely in relation to HS than SP; SP, because of its
partly non-empirical, subjective and judgmental basis, allows greater
opportunity to consider futures that have less basis in current in-
formation, but for which an internally-consistent and plausible set of
causes can be described.
The problem with HS' empirical basis, in which identiﬁed trends in
the form of weak signals are then interpreted and become early warn-
ings, is the likelihood that such an exercise will focus attention on the
identiﬁed potential futures which can be evidenced, at the expense of
those left unconsidered, which cannot be evidenced because they do not
have any present objective basis. HS places emphasis on the
identiﬁcation of pre-existing futures, by which is meant futures which
are already partly emergent, such that they are leaving an evidential
trace which is presently detectable, albeit in only weak form. Whereas a
characteristic of many focal systems of interest on which HS and SP is
carried out is the tendency for disjuncture or step changes to occur,
which represent a break from the past and current trajectory. By con-
trast, the trends identiﬁed in HS represent exactly that – the current
trajectory of a system, and are not, therefore, necessarily representative
of the system's trajectory subsequent to a step change. IL SP, when
enhanced by the use of recent augmentations designed to deal with the
problem of determinism, can assist with this problem. We later high-
light how one such augmentation, the Backwards Logic Method, can be
particularly useful in this regard when combined with HS.
5.1. Integration of scenario planning and horizon scanning in practice
A review of extant literature was conducted to identify studies that
suggest or illustrate the integration of SP &HS in practice. The ﬁrst step
was to gather and survey existing scholarly work on SP, HS, weak
signals and EWS. This involved an extensive search for scholarly peer-
reviewed journal articles from the Business Source Complete, Emerald
Insight, Science Direct and ProQuest databases. The search covered a
twenty-year time period, however, during the search it was discovered
that the bulk of horizon scanning literature emerged between 2004 and
2013, with the most popular years of SP &HS joint initiatives being
2011 and 2012. Speciﬁc search terms included horizon scanning, sce-
nario planning, weak signals and variations such as, scenario thinking,
scenario-based approach, strategic planning and early warning, to name
a few. A total of one hundred and thirty-six papers met this criteria and
were in the subject areas of business and management, technology,
health and public policy. A number of the articles are from the journals
of Futures, Long Range Planning, Foresight, Technological
Forecasting & Social Change and Science & Public Policy.
The second step was to determine whether the article was relevant
to the review by excluding articles that did not contain keywords in the
body of the text, as some were only mentioned in the references,
footnotes and appendices, or discuss HS or SP, or use SP methods in HS
activities. During this process, the articles were coded and classiﬁed
Table 1
Existing research on the integration of SP &HS in practice.
Study Case example Context Method Conducted
Amanatidou et al. (2012) Emerging Science and Technology project Public policy Case study Both
Boe-Lillegraven and Monterde (2015) Cisco Systems Inc. Technological Case study Both
Day and Schoemaker (2005) Multiple contexts Business strategy Conceptual framework/
proposition
Both
Garnett et al. (2016) Department for Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs
(Defra)
Public policy Case study Academic
Habegger (2010) Three EU countries Public policy Comparative case study Review
Ilmola and Kuusi (2006) Energy company Business strategy Case study Academic
Kayser and Bierwisch (2016) Social media Foresight practices Empirical Academic
Kováříková & Grosová (2014) Metal processing industry Foresight practices Empirical Academic
Miles and Saritas (2012) Multiple contexts Health policy Literature review/critique Academic
Oliver Schwarz (2005) Anonymous Company & Industry Business strategy Case study Academic
Palomino et al. (2012a, b) Multiple contexts Foresight practices Literature review/critique Both
Palomino, Taylor, Owen &McBridge (2012b) Multiple contexts Health policy Literature review/critique Academic
Pang (2010) Social Media Foresight practices Literature review/critique Academic
Ramírez, Österman &Grönquist (2013) Technology &Oil Industry Business strategy Case study Academic
Rossel (2011) Multiple contexts Business strategy Literature review/critique Practitioner
Saritas and Smith (2011) National context Public policy Survey Both
Schoemaker et al. (2013) Security & Defence Business strategy Case study Academic
Schultz (2006) Multiple contexts Business strategy Conceptual framework/
proposition
Practitioner
Tessun (1997) Competition in the automotive industry Business strategy Case study Practitioner
van Rij (2012) Multiple contexts Foresight practices Literature review/critique Academic
van Rij (2010) UK, Netherlands & Denmark Public policy Case study Practitioner
Weber et al. (2012) Future-oriented technology analysis (FTA) Technological Conceptual framework/
proposition
Practitioner
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based on their context, research type, methods, profession of the au-
thors, mode of analysis, information sources, whether they contained
all the primary keywords and whether they provided advice on the
identiﬁcation of forward indicators, weak signals or any potential fu-
ture trends in HS.
Twenty-two studies met the inclusion and exclusion criteria and
explicitly suggest or illustrate the use or integration of SP & HS. Table 1
provides a brief summary of the ﬁndings, their case example, suggested
or applied context, methodology and whether they were conducted by
an academic, practitioner or a joint venture between the two. They
provide varying degrees of advice on the identiﬁcation of weak signals
in HS, ranging from simply acknowledging this step must occur before
evaluating future plans, strategies or policies, to detailed descriptions
and protocols on how to facilitate this process (Table 2).
Oliver Schwarz (2005) and Schoemaker et al. (2013) argue that
detecting weak signals is achieved by scanning the organizational en-
vironment; where Schoemaker et al. (2013) add that ‘a good way to
select a signal and fast-forward its development is through scanning the
environment and the use of scenario planning or other future-mapping
techniques (pg. 139)’. Kovarikova and Grosova (2014) also aﬃrm sce-
nario-based identiﬁcation, but highlight that the identiﬁcation of weak
signals is based on the scenarios created and how they are inﬂuenced by
personnel and the perception of the analyst; therefore, they emphasize
that diﬀerent attributes must also be recognised which are both in line
with and beyond their own knowledge and experience (pg. 35).
Most scholars follow a line of argument which suggests that di-
versity, discontinuity and environmental disturbances are key to iden-
tifying weak signals. They contend that the process of identiﬁcation
should be conducted in a participatory environment that represents a
variety of competences or viewpoints, but that it more importantly
draws on several diverse sources of information to accurately anticipate
discontinuities or disruptive dynamics (Habegger, 2010; Miles and
Saritas, 2012; Schultz, 2006; van Rij, 2012, 2010; Weber et al., 2012).
Accordingly, in the Big Picture study, Saritas and Smith (2011) con-
ducted a survey at the 2008 Future-oriented Technology Analysis (FTA)
Conference of foresight practitioners with varying degrees of experi-
ence about potential and existing weak signals; and in Boe-Lillegraven
and Monterde's (2015) case study on Cisco Systems Inc., the idea was to
establish a ‘network of technology scouts to provide early identiﬁcation
of novel technologies and trends and to enable informed strategic de-
cision-making and to help stimulate innovation (pg. 71)’.
Out of the twenty-two studies, six provided some level of detail on
the identiﬁcation of weak signals, where each of them suggested or
used web-based approaches combined with expert opinions, colla-
borative workshops, crowdsourcing, network analysis and interviews
which are all underpinned by scenario narratives. Amanatidou et al.
(2012) suggests that prior to the identiﬁcation of weak signals, planners
must diﬀerentiate between exploratory and issue-centred modes of HS;
where exploratory scanning focuses on ‘emerging issues from a wide
variety of data and diﬀerent signal sources and expert interviews, while
the issue-centred approach concentrates on identifying core documents
and narratives (pg. 213)’. They advocate a primarily web-based ap-
proach, since ‘the identiﬁcation, processing and analysis of weak signals
and emerging issues requires the help of various levels of automation…
a well-deﬁned methodological framework… and professional scanners’
who are assisted by expert panels and reviewers.
Palomino et al. (2012b) and Ramirez et al. (2013) follow a similar
approach. The former states ‘that emerging trends, opportunities and
constraints are identiﬁed via formal meetings, such as conferences and
workshops, and informal networking, supplemented by material ob-
tained from the literature and media…these are put into the web-based
Horizon Scanning System (HSS) (pg. 140)’, monitored, and the outputs
are then periodically communicated in the form of newsletters or re-
ports. The latter conducted a comparative case study between Nokia
and Statoil, they directly link HS with the output of a prior SP activity
which is taken to drive the subsequent identiﬁcation and monitoring of
weak signals. They derived pre-set categories from the scenarios and
used them to collect and track qualitative and quantitative signals, from
various sources such as the internet, news, company reports, consumer
surveys and employee opinions, which are then continuously monitored
Table 2
Extant advice on the identiﬁcation of weak signals.
Advice on the identiﬁcation of weak signals Study
Environmental scanning
“Detecting weak signals is achieved by scanning the organizational environment” Oliver Schwarz (2005)
Scenario-based identiﬁcation & environmental scanning
“A good way to select a signal and fast-forward its development is through scanning the
environment and the use of scenario planning or other future-mapping techniques (pg.
139)”
Schoemaker et al. (2013); Kovarikova and Grosova (2014)
Diversity, discontinuity and disturbance
Require diverse opinions and backgrounds to identify discontinuity & disruptive dynamics van Rij (2010); Miles and Saritas, 2012; Habegger (2010); Weber et al. (2012);
van Rij (2012); Schultz (2006); Saritas and Smith (2011), Boe-Lillegraven and
Monterde (2015)
Web-based scanning, diverse & expert opinion multiple
“The identiﬁcation of weak signals and emerging issues requires the help of various levels of
automation… and professional scanners”
Amanatidou et al. (2012)
“Emerging trends, opportunities and constraints are identiﬁed via formal meetings, such as
conferences and workshops, and informal networking, supplemented by material obtained
from the literature and media… these are put into the web-based Horizon Scanning System
(HSS) (pg. 140)”
Palomino et al. (2012b)
“Collect and track qualitative and quantitative signals, from various sources such as the internet,
news, company reports, consumer surveys and employee opinions, which are then
continuously monitored and also compiled into periodical reports (pg. 832).”
Ramirez et al. (2013)
Network analysis and web-based approaches to derive potential weak signals. Garnett et al. (2016)
Social media, online networks & crowdsourcing
Twitter and online networks such as FutureMonitor to crowdsource potential future trends. Pang (2010), Kayser and Bierwisch (2016)
Schoemaker et al. (2013)
Assume weak signals previously known
Provide no advice or assume weak signals are previously known Ilmola and Kuusi (2006) Tessun (1997), Rossel (2011), Palomino et al. (2012a,
2012b)
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and also compiled into periodical reports. In their study, they stressed
that the changes and developments in each category must be system-
atically tracked and interpreted to determine which ‘scenarios had
become more likely as a result of the signals (pg. 832)’. Garnett et al.
(2016) compiled a database from workshop sessions, as this was ‘cri-
tical to arriving at a shared view of potential drivers of change within
the policy environment (pg. 85)’ and combined this with network
analysis and web-based approaches to derive potential weak signals.
Pang (2010) and Kayser and Bierwisch (2016) look to social media
and suggest that Twitter is a rich data source for capturing, identifying
and analysing future changes and disruptions, especially by targeting
the monitoring of futurists' tweets. Schoemaker et al. (2013) are more
informative about the details of the mechanics of their approach as they
also use online networks such as FutureMonitor to crowdsource po-
tential future trends; however, they are vague on the focal identiﬁca-
tion issue and simply state that the ‘radar system is continuously fed by
organizational sensors that monitor known indicators as well as by
scanning for unexpected signals (Pg. 818)’.
Finally, Tessun (1997), Rossel (2011) Palomino et al. (2012a,
2012b) do not provide any details on the identiﬁcation of weak signals
in HS activities, they simply acknowledge that organizations must
identify these subtle trends; and Ilmola and Kuusi (2006) present a
framework and case study for ﬁltering weak signals in strategic decision
making, but do not address the identiﬁcation of weak signals; their
research assumes that they are previously known. Table 3 summarises
the extant advice on the identiﬁcation of weak signals.
To summarize, the need to consider both potential futures that do
currently have an evidential basis in the present on the one hand,
alongside the need to consider futures that do not have such a presently-
existing evidential basis, implies that HS and SP are more powerful
when used in combination than in isolation. But, to revert to our dis-
cussion and analysis above, all of the current invectives and re-
commendations will lead to either (i) an unfocussed or (ii) a focussed
but naive assessment of possible futures – since the identiﬁcation of
weak signals will either be happenstance or limited to those prompted
by the already-developed scenarios.
In the ﬁnal section of this paper, we show how using SP to imagine
particular futures without reference to whether they have any current
evidential basis, but then thinking in a backwards fashion to the im-
plied present-day evidence that would suggest their plausibility, fol-
lowed by a gathering of this evidence through HS, can provide for both
an open and unconstrained (by current circumstances) consideration of
the future. We set out our recommended combined approach to HS and
SP through adaptation of the Backwards Logic Method for SP, followed
by incorporation of aspects of HS.
6. The Backwards Logic Method (BLM) for scenario development
and its use with horizon scanning
The BLM method, ﬁrst explicated by Wright and Goodwin (2009),
stands in marked contrast to the basic IL scenario development method.
In the conventional IL scenario development method, the process of
scenario development is ‘forward chaining’. By this we mean that the
process requires workshop participants to generate driving forces (using
the PESTEL dimensions of Politics, Economics, Societal, Technological,
Environmental and Legal) that may impact the issue of concern – often
the viability or continued survival of an organization. Once these
driving forces have been elicited, the IL process goes on to aid the
identiﬁcation of causal linkages between these forces – represented by
arrows of inﬂuence. Each arrow acts to mark time precedence and
causality – in that a driving force that is placed at the start of an arrow
of inﬂuence comes earlier in time and exerts a causal inﬂuence on the
outcome of the subsequent driving force. The next step in the IL process
is to identify those clusters of driving forces that are most signiﬁcant –
in terms of both the impact of the out-turns of a cluster on the focal
organization and in terms of the degree of predictability of the outcome
of a particular cluster. The two clusters that are rated as the most un-
certain and the most impactful become the basis for the development of
the subsequent set of scenarios. Wright and Cairns (2011) give full,
step-by-step, detail on the IL scenario development process. Note at this
point that the scenarios that are developed have a causal, time pre-
cedence basis within the two signiﬁcant clusters but note also that the
earlier-in-time stating points of a cluster - that initiate a cluster's sub-
sequent unfolding - cannot be identiﬁed before the IL scenario devel-
opment process is initiated. As such, the scenarios that are developed
follow no particular prescription – beyond a requirement that the out-
turns of each focal driving force are diﬀerent from one another, yet
plausible.
By contrast, the Backwards Logic Method for scenario development
starts with a focus on the objectives of the focal organization and asks
workshop participants to imagine both an extreme (but plausible) ne-
gative achievement and an extreme (but plausible) positive achieve-
ment of these objectives. The next step in the process is to ask workshop
participants to imagine, by “backward chaining”, the causes, and causal
chaining, of these extreme developments. Table 3 compares and con-
trast the basic IL method with the BLM.
This BLM process can be easily adapted to aid identiﬁcation of
important - in terms of the viability of the focal organization – early
warning signals of extreme negative or positive futures. In short, an
augmentation of the backwards Logic Method (BLM) for scenario de-
velopment, set out in step-by-step fashion below, gives us a solution to
the diﬃculty of identifying weak signals of important futures:
Step 1 - Identify the objectives that the organization wishes to
achieve through its activities. For proﬁt-seeking organizations,
commonly-held objectives are: improved market share, improved
short-term proﬁtability, improved cash-ﬂow, improved long-term
proﬁtability, improved return on investments, etc. For non-proﬁt-
seeking organizations, commonly-held objectives might include:
enhanced public awareness of issues, greater access to the political
arena, long-term commitment to action, etc.
Step 2 - Imagine the range of extreme – but still plausible –
achievement of each of the objectives of importance to the organi-
zation. The extremes should be high and low, under- and over-
achievement, poor and good performance, etc.
Step 3 - List the factors that could cause these changes in levels of
achievement of the organization's key objectives. For example, an
extremely negative cash-ﬂow could be caused by public concern
over the safety of one of the organization's key products or services
which results in a step-change downwards in sales of the product or
Table 3
Comparison of standard and backwards logic scenario methods.
Conventional Intuitive Logics method Backwards Logic Method
Underpinning basis for scenario development Causality Causality
Starting point for scenario development and focus of
subsequent HS activity
Components of the chosen two high-impact high-
uncertainty clusters.
The (non-) achievement of an extreme in an
organization's key objective.
Number of scenarios that are developed in detail Four One or more
Focus on stakeholder behaviour/reactions in relation to
unfolding scenario events
Low High
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service. Conversely, an extremely positive cash-ﬂow could be caused
by public concern about a competitor's product or service. A line of
questioning should be enacted that identiﬁes the causal chain that
results in the extreme achievement, or non-achievement, of a par-
ticular key objective.
Step 4 - Consider the extreme achievement of each of the objectives
that you have identiﬁed. Could another plausible causal chain of
events result in an equivalent outcome? If so, pursue a separate line
of questioning to fully identify that separate causal chain. For ex-
ample, an extremely negative cash-ﬂow could also be caused by a
labour force strike which results in a step-change downwards in the
production (and therefore sales) of the product or service.
Step 5 - Investigate if the achievement and non-achievement of a
particular key objective could now, with re-consideration, be plau-
sibly made more extreme than that identiﬁed at Step 2. If so, Steps 3
and 4 should be repeated for the more-extreme achievement of the
organization's objectives. If not, the scenario team participants
should be encouraged to write down explicit reasons as to why this
is viewed to be the case.
Step 6 - Inspect each of the causal chains that were created at Steps 3
and 4 and identify the earliest-in-time driving forces in each of the
chains that are identiﬁed. Designate each of these ‘initiator’ driving
forces with the title of an ‘early warning signal’ or ‘ﬂag’. Note that
these ﬂags might designate either (i) particular resolved un-
certainties, (ii) particular change to heighten or dampen trends that
are already taking place, or (ii) the actions of powerful stakeholders
who act to preserve or enhance their own interests in the light of
unfolding events.
As an example of our BLM HS method in practice, consider the
following detailed example of its application within the UK education
system.
6.1. Integration of the Backwards Logic Method of scenario planning and
horizon scanning in practice
Recently, many changes have occurred to the strategic landscape in
the Higher Education (HE) sector in the UK, resulting in increased
uncertainty. As a result of this, a UK university wished to consider what
may trigger potential extreme outcomes for the university in the future,
so as to develop contingencies and form mitigating strategies. As such, a
BLM scenario planning exercise to identify Early Warning Signals of
potential extreme outcomes was conducted. In step 1 of the process a
number of objectives were identiﬁed relating to the university's most
recent strategic review. These included improvement in the university's
standing on a number of national and global university rankings, in-
creased recruitment of students, an improved research rating, and
generation of a ﬁnancial surplus that can be used for reinvestment.
In step 2 of the process extreme outcomes were imagined for these
objectives. In terms of positive outcomes deemed to represent ex-
tremely good performance, the considered outcomes were, for example
i) entering the top 50 on a particular university ranking considered to
be prestigious, and on which the university was currently ranked a lot
lower than 50 ii) increasing registered student numbers by 25%, re-
presenting a very large increase, and iii) generating a large ﬁnancial
surplus of 8% for reinvestment in new buildings and infrastructure. In
terms of negative outcomes deemed to represent extremely bad per-
formance the considered outcomes were, for example: i) the university's
place on the identiﬁed prestigious ranking slipping to lower than 130,
which is considerably lower than its current ranking ii) the number of
registered students falling by more than 10%, and iii) the university
making a ﬁnancial loss of greater than 5% of its present turnover.
In step 3, factors that might result in these outcomes were identi-
ﬁed. These included i) factors related to recent, already-implemented
government policy changes speciﬁc to the HE sector ii) changes that
might take place in the future but which have not yet taken place, and
(iii) broader and longer-standing issues and trends related to the UK
economy and demography. An example of a recent policy change spe-
ciﬁc to the UK HE sector was the very recent introduction of a Teaching
Excellence Framework (TEF) through which to monitor teaching
quality in UK universities, and which directly impacts university
funding by aﬀecting the size of tuition fee the university is allowed to
charge. An example of broader issues and trends that could impact HE
is, to cite the most obvious example raised by participants, the UK's
forthcoming departure from the EU, which raises questions in terms of
future overseas student numbers, as-well-as UK universities' ability to
recruit staﬀ from the EU.
The line of questioning that was used in relation to the extreme
outcomes identiﬁed in step 2, and how the factors identiﬁed in step 3
were combined by the participants to consider the causal-chain logic by
which the extreme outcome might come about, can be illustrated by
reference to the extreme outcome of a ﬁnancial loss of greater than 8%.
Participants identiﬁed a combination of causal factors that might occur
simultaneously and compound the eﬀect of each other, thereby greatly
undermining the university's ﬁnancial position. So, for example, the
recent introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework was con-
sidered to place greater emphasis on quality of teaching, requiring that
it be allocated more attention and resource, and thereby reducing the
amount of resource available for conducting large-scale research, which
had previously been a source of signiﬁcant income for the university.
Furthermore, because of relatively lower-levels of attention paid to
teaching quality previously, a concern expressed was that the university
might receive a poor rating for teaching quality in the then forthcoming
ﬁrst TEF assessment. This would reduce its attractiveness to students,
who would opt to go to alternative universities instead, thereby redu-
cing the level of tuition fees received by the university. These factors
were then considered to be compounded by the UK's departure from the
EU and the UK government's renewed emphasis on reducing immigra-
tion, which resulted in a parallel reduction in the number of overseas
postgraduate students – presently a key source of the university's in-
come. The identiﬁed chain of logic therefore comprised several inter-
acting factors which, when combined, could result in the considered
extreme outcome – in this case, a negative one related to the university
performing very badly ﬁnancially.
However, in step 4 of the process, participants considered whether
this same extreme outcome could occur through other means.
Alternative causal-chain logic was identiﬁed, involving some of the
same factors, but playing out in a diﬀerent way, as-well-as in-
corporating additional causal factors not considered in the initial causal
chain described above. An example was a further, snap general election,
called because of the collapse of the UK's now minority government,
which resulted from its inability to negotiate an acceptable deal for the
UK's departure from the EU. The election then resulted in the Labour
Party forming a new government with a large majority, with one of
their manifesto policies being the abolition of UK tuition fees, which
they then implement. However, when doing so, the new Labour gov-
ernment replaces tuition fees with central government funding for HE,
but the amount of funding is inadequate and does not fully oﬀset the
loss in funding from tuition fees. This results in an extreme ﬁnancial
loss by alternative means to those originally considered.
Interestingly, in step 5 of the process, participants realised that if
this alternative causal-logic did indeed play out - and by this point the
participants considered it to be highly plausible - it could result in a still
more extreme outcome than originally conceived in step 2. A signiﬁcant
number of universities could go bankrupt and either disappear, or have
to be ﬁnancially bailed out by the government at great cost in terms of
their independence and reputation. The participants considered their
own institution potentially to be one of the ‘losers’, should this scenario
transpire.
Indeed, this newly-considered causal logic, resulting in a still more
extreme outcome than originally considered, was now deemed so
plausible that in the ﬁnal step of the process - step 6 - it was identiﬁed
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that UK HE institutions, including the participants' own organization
through various existing channels, should already be lobbying the
Labour Party to ensure that any central-government funding that might
replace tuition fees would more than oﬀset the funding lost by their
abolition, and should perhaps even represent an increase in funding,
since UK universities should be deemed key to refocusing the UK
economy in light of Brexit. Herein we see the identiﬁcation of a causal
factor related to powerful actors, both in the form of a new and highly
popular Labour government with a large majority, and in terms of
university lobby groups, which might act to both cause a still more
extreme outcome in the ﬁrst instance, or, in the case of university lobby
groups, might attempt to pre-empt and mitigate the possibility for such
an extreme outcome. Identiﬁed early warning causal factors were, then,
an increasing stalemate in Brexit negotiations, or a further reduction of
the present Conservative government's already fragile coalition (with
the DUP) majority, perhaps resulting from a lost bye-election, and
leading to a collapse of the government and a further election.
But, even so, will all weak signals of important extreme futures be
monitored? As an additional measure, not included in the above case
application, we recommend adoption of Meissner et al.'s (2017) ap-
proach to ‘blind-spot detection’. In our adaptation of their so-called
‘360° stakeholder feedback’, members of an organization and, im-
portantly, outsiders (whom are likely to have diﬀerent mental models
and viewpoints, but at the same time be knowledgeable about the focal
organization and its environment) can be asked to identify driving
forces that could impact the focal organization's achievement of its key
objectives. If the external experts' ratings of both the impact and un-
certainty of a particular factor are signiﬁcantly higher than those of the
internal experts then, in Meissner et al.’s analysis, a ‘blind spot’ is
present within the organization. Meissner et al.’s innovation essentially
provides a means to aggregate elicited knowledge, placing emphasis on
bias reduction and, importantly, identifying peripheral views (recall
our discussion of the inherent diﬃculty of this task in Section 3.3,
above). But the technique assumes that identiﬁed trends and causal
factors, currently in their infancy, but which have only been identiﬁed
by a minority of expert respondents in the ﬁrst round of a two-round
approach, which are then attributed high importance once they have
been brought to the attention of the group as a whole in the second
round, are representative of weak signals.
Importantly, both the BLM and the 360° stakeholder feedback
technique assume that any future which may subsequently prove of
importance is currently leaving a trace behind in the present and recent
past. HS, by itself, has no method for identifying important weak sig-
nals, whilst the IL scenario planning's identiﬁcation of signals (i.e., early
events in particular causal chains) will not, necessarily, be the im-
portant precursors of signiﬁcant futures for a focal organization that
can then be monitored in a HS on-going activity. Only the BLM ap-
proach to scenario development is likely to direct attention to those
important signals that may, or may not, already show an evidential base
in the present or recent past. But, for an organization to be fully pre-
pared for any signiﬁcant future, all of these methods show weaknesses.
In such circumstances we recommend that an ‘antifragile’ approach is
taken by an organization - where the organization actively seeks posi-
tions where the down side of events is ‘clipped’ or limited but the upside
is unlimited. Derbyshire and Wright (2014) give more detail on this
non-deterministic approach to planning for the future.
The BLM scenario development approach is relatively new but the
approach of focused construction of extreme futures has been recently
utilized in the developing of scenarios for the future of Botswana
(Plakas et al., 2017). Here, one extreme negative scenario was devel-
oped and entitled ‘Caught between a rock and a hard place’ where the
key driving force resolutions were a declining income to the country
from diamonds and a low level of investment in education. The key
weak signals at the beginning of the unfolding of this very negative
future were identiﬁed as a failure of the Botswanian government to
diversify the economy away from diamonds despite eﬀorts towards
expanding tourism in the country and foreign direct investment
slowing. Another scenario exploration, this time for the future of for
Zimbabwe, by Belfrage et al. (2017) created a scenario that was named
‘You can't eat policy’. At the beginning of this extremely negative fu-
ture, early warning signals were identiﬁes as unfavorable climate for
crops, instability of rights to land, and insuﬃcient employment to meet
demand. In a case study of the use of extreme ‘branching scenarios’,
Cairns et al. (in press) identiﬁed early warning signals as a weak Aus-
tralian economy and rising oil prices – that would lead, eventually, to
further lack of progress in the regeneration of the Australian state of
Tasmania.
To further clarify the value of the BLM method of identifying weak
signals, consider the case study of the top team of a residential mort-
gage division of a UK-based bank at the end of 2007, as detailed in
Wright and Goodwin (2009). At this point in time, residential house
prices had continued to rise over the previous 15 years and, intuitively,
house price rises were seen to be a pre-determined of the future – so
much so that the top team spent time considering seriously the creation
of a new mortgage product – a multi-generational mortgage product
that could be handed down from parents to children, such that a house
purchase could be made with the future payments of future generations
of a family. Imagine, if at that time, the bank had been asked to con-
sider its fundamental objects (see step 1 of the process above) and that
these were identiﬁed as increased market share and increased absolute
amount lent to house buyers. At step 2, extreme outcomes would have
been developed such as ‘a collapse in house prices’ and ‘a collapse in the
conﬁdence of potential purchasers in housing value’. At step 3, the
causal factors identiﬁed would, likely, have been those linked to ‘in-
ability of purchasers to pay their monthly mortgage payment install-
ments’ etc. It is easy to see that the latter driving force could be iden-
tiﬁed, and then utilized, as an early-in-time early warning signal of a
very negative scenario for the UK bank. In short, horizon scanning ac-
tivity around this ‘ﬂag’ would be worthwhile.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have documented the Intuitive Logics approach to
scenario development and considered both its perspective-broadening
and perspective-narrowing attributes. We also analyzed Horizon
Scanning as a foresight activity and demonstrated that the extant
practice-based literature is both vague and unfocussed in terms of ad-
vice on the identiﬁcation of important but weak signals. Any integra-
tion of already-developed scenarios that are produced by the basic
Intuitive Logics method with subsequent Horizon Scanning activities is
likely to lead to inappropriate conﬁdence in the comprehensiveness of
an organization's preparedness for possible futures. By contrast, in-
tegration of Horizon Scanning activities with the outputs of the
Backwards Logic Method for scenario development will focus the at-
tention of Horizon Scanning on the precursors of important extreme
futures that could impact the organization and its key objectives.
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